11 May 2009
Dear Michael Spagat,
Many people have been wondering why you have such a bee in your bonnet about the Lancet Iraq Mortality Studies. I don't. Its pretty obvious to me. Your own conflict of interest and that of colleagues such as Madelyn Hsiao-Rei Hicks is patently obvious.
In previous research papers such as "Universal patterns underlying ongoing wars and terrorism", calculations and conclusions were made, based on data for civilian killings provided by: IBC! You are also intimately connected to CERAC (as is Dr. Hicks), whose own CERAC Integrated Iraq Dataset (CIID) "builds on the event description from three datasets that monitor violence in Iraq: Iraq Body Count , iCasualties and ITERATE." Further, the Dept. of Economics at the Royal Holloway, University of London, also uses IBC in its country specific datasets.
Let's be clear, using figures from an organization that itself admitted were an undercount of victims ("Our maximum therefore refers to reported deaths - which can only be a sample of true deaths unless one assumes that every civilian death has been reported. It is likely that many if not most civilian casualties will go unreported by the media") and then deleting figures from that undercount, as you did for example in the above mentioned paper, can only mean that the conclusions reached in these papers and indeed any other that used the IBC figures, have been seriously compromised, especially considering the numbers reported in the 2 Lancet studies. And this explains your mania with Lancet.
Apart from the conflict of interest, which you fail to mention in any of your work, you also have a strange tendency to attack any critics of the Colombian government of Uribe, connected in his early days in Medellín to the cocaine cartels, and recently to all sorts of human rights abuses. I wonder if the fact that some of your funding has come from Colombia's central bank: Banco de la República has anything to do with this, or is it simply an ideological thing?
In 2007 you took it upon yourself to attempt to discredit AI & HRW's reports on Colombia in your paper The Work of Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch: Evidence from Colombia. This work and your attempts to discredit these 2 NGOs is characterised by a clear attempt to reduce the figures of victims as well as attempting to muddy the waters regarding state complicity with the paramilitaries in the human rights atrocities in Colombia. This is comparable to the work of Holocaust deniers who look to reduce at all costs, the number of Jews killed in that horrific crime. As you yourself acknowledge "The free flow of accurate information on patterns of violence can make a critical contribution to conflict resolution. Yet warring parties tend to compete to distort the relevant information in their favor." One can see which warring party you are working for...
In "The Colombian Conflict: Uribe's First 17 Months (J. Restrepo and M. Spagat), CEPR Discussion Paper 4570, 2004" you stated: "paramilitary groups...neither belong to the institutional apparatus nor are under the command and control of the state" That has now been shown to have ignored the reality that there has been tight collaboration between both. Both AI & HRW challenged these suppositions and still do as their reply to your paper shows: "Recent revelations about the degree of paramilitary infiltration in various state institutions, including the security forces, the legislature, and the DAS appear only to have confirmed what AI and other NGOs have been saying publicly for years. In many cases, AI has found it difficult to separate security force from paramilitary responsibility in killings, since there is evidence of the involvement of both. In fact, in many cases in which the article might describe the evidence for collusion as being "soft", subsequent research and/or judicial investigations have corroborated AI’s initial claims."
As both HRW and AI reports challenged many of your basic assumptions, they too had to be discredited. However, as your work is based on false assumptions and inaccurate staistics, it is actually your work that should be discredited.
David Sketchley
Seville, Spain
Needless to say, a reply was never received.
02 January 2012
The Shock Doctrine
A documentary adaptation Naomi Klein's 2007 book, The Shock Doctrine. An investigation of disaster capitalism, based on Naomi Klein's proposition that neo-liberal capitalism feeds on natural disasters, war and terror to establish its dominance.
Based on breakthrough historical research and four years of on-the-ground reporting in disaster zones, The Shock Doctrine vividly shows how disaster capitalism -- the rapid-fire corporate re-engineering of societies still reeling from shock -- did not begin with September 11, 2001.
The film traces its origins back fifty years, to the University of Chicago under Milton Friedman, which produced many of the leading neo-conservative and neo-liberal thinkers whose influence is still profound in Washington today.
New, surprising connections are drawn between economic policy, shock and awe warfare and covert CIA-funded experiments in electroshock and sensory deprivation in the 1950s, research that helped write the torture manuals used today in Guantanamo Bay.
The Shock Doctrine follows the application of these ideas through our contemporary history, showing in riveting detail how well-known events of the recent past have been deliberate, active theatres for the shock doctrine, among them: Pinochet's coup in Chile in 1973, the Falklands War in 1982, the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Asian Financial crisis in 1997 and Hurricane Mitch in 1998.
Based on breakthrough historical research and four years of on-the-ground reporting in disaster zones, The Shock Doctrine vividly shows how disaster capitalism -- the rapid-fire corporate re-engineering of societies still reeling from shock -- did not begin with September 11, 2001.
The film traces its origins back fifty years, to the University of Chicago under Milton Friedman, which produced many of the leading neo-conservative and neo-liberal thinkers whose influence is still profound in Washington today.
New, surprising connections are drawn between economic policy, shock and awe warfare and covert CIA-funded experiments in electroshock and sensory deprivation in the 1950s, research that helped write the torture manuals used today in Guantanamo Bay.
The Shock Doctrine follows the application of these ideas through our contemporary history, showing in riveting detail how well-known events of the recent past have been deliberate, active theatres for the shock doctrine, among them: Pinochet's coup in Chile in 1973, the Falklands War in 1982, the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Asian Financial crisis in 1997 and Hurricane Mitch in 1998.
El Mono Egoista - The Selfish Ape
Increible documental sobre el primate egoísta: nosotros.
This documentary is trying to point out that despite the development of our civilization in this the 21st century, our genetic legacy is still there and the primate we used to be remains in us and determines our lives much more than we suspect.
The human being is not as smart as he thinks and has simply become a SELFISH APE.
Written and directed by Fernando López - Mirones
This documentary is trying to point out that despite the development of our civilization in this the 21st century, our genetic legacy is still there and the primate we used to be remains in us and determines our lives much more than we suspect.
The human being is not as smart as he thinks and has simply become a SELFISH APE.
Written and directed by Fernando López - Mirones
14 November 2011
08 November 2011
Debtocracy. Deudocracia
A must watch, Want to know what's behind the Greek Debt? Ever heard of 'Odious Debt'? In international law, odious debt is a legal theory that holds that the national debt incurred by a regime for purposes that do not serve the best interests of the nation, should not be enforceable. Such debts are, thus, considered by this doctrine to be personal debts of the regime that incurred them and not debts of the state.
Now watch;
Now watch;
11 October 2011
02 October 2011
Prof. Joseph E. Stiglitz: The State of the Global Economy
Prof. Joseph E. Stiglitz at the World Bank. Will they listen though?
Prof. Joseph E. Stiglitz: The State of the Global Economy from World Bank on Vimeo.
04 September 2011
Felipe Gonzalez 'preocupado' con gestión de Zapatero en política exterior
En cable con fecha 22 fevrero 2010:
Gonzalez "compartió sus preocupaciones sobre la gestión de la política exterior española en general del presidente Zapatero"
No solo eso, pero el 'socialista' Gonzalez estaba "en gran medida de acuerdo con el enfoque de los EE.UU" en latino-america.
Gonzalez "compartió sus preocupaciones sobre la gestión de la política exterior española en general del presidente Zapatero"
No solo eso, pero el 'socialista' Gonzalez estaba "en gran medida de acuerdo con el enfoque de los EE.UU" en latino-america.
Wikileaks: La seguridad de los centrales nucleares españoles tienen debilidad
Según el cable del 19 febrero 2010 la seguridad de los centrales nucleares tienen debilidad: no protegen de un ataque de alguién de dentro y el gobierno de España está bastante preocupado con como defenderse de esta posibilidad...
Geoană assured US: Romania's fundamentally pro-US orientation "safe" for at least two more generations
| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 06BUCHAREST1665 | 2006-10-31 16:38 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Bucharest |
VZCZCXRO5399 OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHBM #1665/01 3041638 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 311638Z OCT 06 FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5470 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUCHAREST 001665 SIPDIS SIPDIS INR PLEASE PASS TO DNI E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL RO SUBJECT: DNI NEGROPONTE MEETING WITH OPPOSITION PSD PRESIDENT MIRCEA GEOANA Classified By: Amb. Nicholas Taubman for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: At a meeting with DNI Negroponte and the Ambassador, opposition PSD head Mircea Geoana evinced concern about a posssible post-EU accession malaise in Romanian politics, with weak and divided governance for the next several years. Geoana was skeptical about prospects for early elections and favored creation of a "grand coalition" of leading moderate parties on the German model. On attitudes towards the U.S., Geoana said some "rebalancing" between Romania's "transatlanticist" and "European" orientations might take place, but geopolitics assured that Romania's fundamentally transatlanticist orientation was "safe" for at least two more generations. Geoana argued for a regional solution to the Kosovo issue, noting that the international community could move relatively fast on Kosovar independence if it was linked to a renewed commitment to the Balkan region as a whole. With EU entry for many Balkan nations unlikely, NATO had to pick up the slack as default "mentor" in the region. Geoana argued that Romania was wasting an opportunity to work with new Eastern European members of the EU in creating a new "Vilnius Group" encompassing the Baltics to the Black Sea. On intelligence matters, Geoana encouraged new links between Romanian parliamentary committees overseeing the intelligence community and their US counterparts. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Opposition PSD President Mircea Geoana met with Director of National Intelligence Negroponte and Ambassador Taubman October 29. Geoana prefaced the meeting by comparing Romania's political scene to an ice skating competition; Romania had performed superbly in the obligatory routines needed for acceptance into all of the right clubs--WTO, NATO, and now the European Union--but it was uncertain whether it could do as well in the "freestyle" segment now that the constraints of candidacy were lifted. He said Romanian politics exemplified the lack of an overall strategic vision among Romania's political leaders as well as a vicious political culture that stressed the "total demolition" of one's political enemies. ¶3. (C) Geoana was skeptical about prospects for early elections, noting that elections for the European Parliament would likely occur in May 2007, with municipal elections in June 2008 and a Presidential election taking place in 2009. President Basescu was alone in pushing for early elections, hoping to capitalize on his current high popularity ratings. Basescu also feared that a weak PD showing in future municipal elections could erode his prospects in the Presidential contest. Geoana opined that a reshuffle among coalition partners was possible depending on how long Prime Minister Tariceanu survived. Tariceanu was weakened, but still fighting for his political life. Geoana warned that if Tariceanu goes, Romania could return to the "piranha politics" of the 1990s, with Basescu installing a more compliant puppet as Prime Minister. ¶4. (C) Regarding future coalition combinations, Geoana said that anything was possible, including continuation of the PD/PNL alliance; a strong PD combined with satellite parties; a PD/PSD alliance, or even a PSD/PNL government. Two likely options included a "new majority" centered around Basescu, or some sort of "grand coalition" akin to Germany. The latter option (which he preferred) would use as a pretext the need for mainstream Romanian parties to collectively meet the challenges of EU membership. A PD/PNL merger was unlikely given the liberals' pride in their 100-year history and traditions. Geoana anticipated that the next two and half years could prove an extraordinarily "unconstructive" time for Romanian politics, with political paralysis and loss of momentum after the January 1 EU accession. Romania risked following in Poland's footsteps in mismanaging the first few years after EU entry, providing an opening for extremist and populist voices to dominate Romanian politics in the future. ¶5. (C) On attitudes towards the United States, Geoana said that Romania was currently so pro-American that one had to anticipate a future rebalancing between its "transatlanticist" and "European" orientations. Geography would never allow Romania to "relax" and hence the current security construction with the United States was safe for at least two more generations. He added that the U.S. shouldn't take Romania's future pro-US orientation for granted or assume that it would be automatic. Geoana added that while he didn't like the President, he had to admit that Basecsu was "solid" with regards to his transatlanticist inclinations. Geoana also noted the need to develop new institutions to anchor US-Romanian ties after USAID pulled out. These might include the Black Sea Trust Fund, the Aspen Institute, even the Harvard Club. He added that it was not a question of USG BUCHAREST 00001665 002 OF 002 funding, since there was now a huge network of influential Romanians who knew and loved the United States, including many corporate leaders. ¶6. (C) On Kosovo, Geoana said that Kosovar independence must be linked to a "package" of measures for the Balkan region as a whole. Bringing Croatia into the EU and NATO without accounting for the rest of the Balkans was the wrong strategy. With the right "package", the international community could move relatively fast in terms of fostering Kosovo's independence, but changing the status quo in Kosovo must be backed by a renewed commitment to the Balkan region on the part of NATO and the EU. Geoana was doubtful that Macedonia or Alabania were capable of qualifying for EU accession, thus handing NATO the default role of "mentor" to these states. Geoana argued for a strategy other than just "punishing" the Serbs, noting that the Serbian military understood what had to be done, but the Serbian public was still "intoxicated" with the idea of retaining Kosovo. Geoana added that the upcoming German EU Presidency was an opportunity for the United States to work closely with Chancellor Merkel on Kosovo. The relative weakness or lame duck status of other European leaders gave Merkel the opportunity to demonstrate that she could be a "global leader" on this and other issues. Geoana suggested that with the right preparation, Merkel would be receptive to working in tandem with President Bush on a renewed Kosovo strategy as part of Germany's bid for a successful EU presidency. ¶7. (C) Comparing Russia to "an athlete on steroids" Geoana said that he saw both Ukraine and Moldova slowly bending to growing Russian pressure, with Georgia increasingly isolated through Russian energy politics and other "booby traps" from Moscow. Geoana also accused President Basescu of harboring plans to trade Moldovan unification with Romania for tacit acquiescence to allowing Transnistria to become a Russian-run "Kaliningrad" to the east. Geoana said Romania was wasting an opportunity to work with new Eastern European members of the EU in creating a "new European neighborhood policy" from the Baltics to the Black Sea, acting as a Vilnius Group writ large that could influence EU policy towards the East. ¶8. (C) On intelligence matters, Geoana said that the PSD had agreed to Senator Maior becoming the head of Romania's internal service. He said that it was "refreshing" to see a new generation take over the intelligence services given the need to remove the taint of the Ceaucescu-era Securitate, but both Maior and SRI Director Saftoiu were inexperienced and "needed help." He said that he was trying to institute a "new rule" in Romanian politics that the domestic intelligence directorship always go to an opposition politician, adding that this was a "precondition" for sending "one of our best young guys" for the post. Geoana also encouraged the DNI to promote contacts between Romanian parliamentary committees overseeing intelligence matters with their counterparts in the United States, as this would be an investment in a more democratic Romania and a better respected intelligence service. ¶9. (C) Comment: Mircea Geoana's views carrry some weight as he is the heir presumptive in any future coalition government involving the PSD. His views on many issues--including his fundamentally transatlanticist orientation, his comments on Kosovo, and remarks on the desirability of creating an Eastern European bloc within the EU--track closely with those shared by many of his ruling coalition counterparts, underscoring that what separates the PSD from the ruling PD and PNL are frequently matters involving personalities, parties, and political nuance, not ideology or policy. Geoana's skepticism regarding the likelihood of early elections, on the other hand, reflects the fact that the PSD's prospects are not encouraging if President Basescu succeeds in getting an early election contest. End Comment. Taubman
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