A documentary adaptation Naomi Klein's 2007 book, The Shock Doctrine. An investigation of disaster capitalism, based on Naomi Klein's proposition that neo-liberal capitalism feeds on natural disasters, war and terror to establish its dominance.
Based on breakthrough historical research and four years of on-the-ground reporting in disaster zones, The Shock Doctrine vividly shows how disaster capitalism -- the rapid-fire corporate re-engineering of societies still reeling from shock -- did not begin with September 11, 2001.
The film traces its origins back fifty years, to the University of Chicago under Milton Friedman, which produced many of the leading neo-conservative and neo-liberal thinkers whose influence is still profound in Washington today.
New, surprising connections are drawn between economic policy, shock and awe warfare and covert CIA-funded experiments in electroshock and sensory deprivation in the 1950s, research that helped write the torture manuals used today in Guantanamo Bay.
The Shock Doctrine follows the application of these ideas through our contemporary history, showing in riveting detail how well-known events of the recent past have been deliberate, active theatres for the shock doctrine, among them: Pinochet's coup in Chile in 1973, the Falklands War in 1982, the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Asian Financial crisis in 1997 and Hurricane Mitch in 1998.
02 January 2012
El Mono Egoista - The Selfish Ape
Increible documental sobre el primate egoísta: nosotros.
This documentary is trying to point out that despite the development of our civilization in this the 21st century, our genetic legacy is still there and the primate we used to be remains in us and determines our lives much more than we suspect.
The human being is not as smart as he thinks and has simply become a SELFISH APE.
Written and directed by Fernando López - Mirones
This documentary is trying to point out that despite the development of our civilization in this the 21st century, our genetic legacy is still there and the primate we used to be remains in us and determines our lives much more than we suspect.
The human being is not as smart as he thinks and has simply become a SELFISH APE.
Written and directed by Fernando López - Mirones
14 November 2011
08 November 2011
Debtocracy. Deudocracia
A must watch, Want to know what's behind the Greek Debt? Ever heard of 'Odious Debt'? In international law, odious debt is a legal theory that holds that the national debt incurred by a regime for purposes that do not serve the best interests of the nation, should not be enforceable. Such debts are, thus, considered by this doctrine to be personal debts of the regime that incurred them and not debts of the state.
Now watch;
Now watch;
11 October 2011
02 October 2011
Prof. Joseph E. Stiglitz: The State of the Global Economy
Prof. Joseph E. Stiglitz at the World Bank. Will they listen though?
Prof. Joseph E. Stiglitz: The State of the Global Economy from World Bank on Vimeo.
04 September 2011
Felipe Gonzalez 'preocupado' con gestión de Zapatero en política exterior
En cable con fecha 22 fevrero 2010:
Gonzalez "compartió sus preocupaciones sobre la gestión de la política exterior española en general del presidente Zapatero"
No solo eso, pero el 'socialista' Gonzalez estaba "en gran medida de acuerdo con el enfoque de los EE.UU" en latino-america.
Gonzalez "compartió sus preocupaciones sobre la gestión de la política exterior española en general del presidente Zapatero"
No solo eso, pero el 'socialista' Gonzalez estaba "en gran medida de acuerdo con el enfoque de los EE.UU" en latino-america.
Wikileaks: La seguridad de los centrales nucleares españoles tienen debilidad
Según el cable del 19 febrero 2010 la seguridad de los centrales nucleares tienen debilidad: no protegen de un ataque de alguién de dentro y el gobierno de España está bastante preocupado con como defenderse de esta posibilidad...
Geoană assured US: Romania's fundamentally pro-US orientation "safe" for at least two more generations
| Reference ID | Created | Released | Classification | Origin |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 06BUCHAREST1665 | 2006-10-31 16:38 | 2011-08-30 01:44 | CONFIDENTIAL | Embassy Bucharest |
VZCZCXRO5399 OO RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR DE RUEHBM #1665/01 3041638 ZNY CCCCC ZZH O 311638Z OCT 06 FM AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5470 INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BUCHAREST 001665 SIPDIS SIPDIS INR PLEASE PASS TO DNI E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/30/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL RO SUBJECT: DNI NEGROPONTE MEETING WITH OPPOSITION PSD PRESIDENT MIRCEA GEOANA Classified By: Amb. Nicholas Taubman for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: At a meeting with DNI Negroponte and the Ambassador, opposition PSD head Mircea Geoana evinced concern about a posssible post-EU accession malaise in Romanian politics, with weak and divided governance for the next several years. Geoana was skeptical about prospects for early elections and favored creation of a "grand coalition" of leading moderate parties on the German model. On attitudes towards the U.S., Geoana said some "rebalancing" between Romania's "transatlanticist" and "European" orientations might take place, but geopolitics assured that Romania's fundamentally transatlanticist orientation was "safe" for at least two more generations. Geoana argued for a regional solution to the Kosovo issue, noting that the international community could move relatively fast on Kosovar independence if it was linked to a renewed commitment to the Balkan region as a whole. With EU entry for many Balkan nations unlikely, NATO had to pick up the slack as default "mentor" in the region. Geoana argued that Romania was wasting an opportunity to work with new Eastern European members of the EU in creating a new "Vilnius Group" encompassing the Baltics to the Black Sea. On intelligence matters, Geoana encouraged new links between Romanian parliamentary committees overseeing the intelligence community and their US counterparts. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Opposition PSD President Mircea Geoana met with Director of National Intelligence Negroponte and Ambassador Taubman October 29. Geoana prefaced the meeting by comparing Romania's political scene to an ice skating competition; Romania had performed superbly in the obligatory routines needed for acceptance into all of the right clubs--WTO, NATO, and now the European Union--but it was uncertain whether it could do as well in the "freestyle" segment now that the constraints of candidacy were lifted. He said Romanian politics exemplified the lack of an overall strategic vision among Romania's political leaders as well as a vicious political culture that stressed the "total demolition" of one's political enemies. ¶3. (C) Geoana was skeptical about prospects for early elections, noting that elections for the European Parliament would likely occur in May 2007, with municipal elections in June 2008 and a Presidential election taking place in 2009. President Basescu was alone in pushing for early elections, hoping to capitalize on his current high popularity ratings. Basescu also feared that a weak PD showing in future municipal elections could erode his prospects in the Presidential contest. Geoana opined that a reshuffle among coalition partners was possible depending on how long Prime Minister Tariceanu survived. Tariceanu was weakened, but still fighting for his political life. Geoana warned that if Tariceanu goes, Romania could return to the "piranha politics" of the 1990s, with Basescu installing a more compliant puppet as Prime Minister. ¶4. (C) Regarding future coalition combinations, Geoana said that anything was possible, including continuation of the PD/PNL alliance; a strong PD combined with satellite parties; a PD/PSD alliance, or even a PSD/PNL government. Two likely options included a "new majority" centered around Basescu, or some sort of "grand coalition" akin to Germany. The latter option (which he preferred) would use as a pretext the need for mainstream Romanian parties to collectively meet the challenges of EU membership. A PD/PNL merger was unlikely given the liberals' pride in their 100-year history and traditions. Geoana anticipated that the next two and half years could prove an extraordinarily "unconstructive" time for Romanian politics, with political paralysis and loss of momentum after the January 1 EU accession. Romania risked following in Poland's footsteps in mismanaging the first few years after EU entry, providing an opening for extremist and populist voices to dominate Romanian politics in the future. ¶5. (C) On attitudes towards the United States, Geoana said that Romania was currently so pro-American that one had to anticipate a future rebalancing between its "transatlanticist" and "European" orientations. Geography would never allow Romania to "relax" and hence the current security construction with the United States was safe for at least two more generations. He added that the U.S. shouldn't take Romania's future pro-US orientation for granted or assume that it would be automatic. Geoana added that while he didn't like the President, he had to admit that Basecsu was "solid" with regards to his transatlanticist inclinations. Geoana also noted the need to develop new institutions to anchor US-Romanian ties after USAID pulled out. These might include the Black Sea Trust Fund, the Aspen Institute, even the Harvard Club. He added that it was not a question of USG BUCHAREST 00001665 002 OF 002 funding, since there was now a huge network of influential Romanians who knew and loved the United States, including many corporate leaders. ¶6. (C) On Kosovo, Geoana said that Kosovar independence must be linked to a "package" of measures for the Balkan region as a whole. Bringing Croatia into the EU and NATO without accounting for the rest of the Balkans was the wrong strategy. With the right "package", the international community could move relatively fast in terms of fostering Kosovo's independence, but changing the status quo in Kosovo must be backed by a renewed commitment to the Balkan region on the part of NATO and the EU. Geoana was doubtful that Macedonia or Alabania were capable of qualifying for EU accession, thus handing NATO the default role of "mentor" to these states. Geoana argued for a strategy other than just "punishing" the Serbs, noting that the Serbian military understood what had to be done, but the Serbian public was still "intoxicated" with the idea of retaining Kosovo. Geoana added that the upcoming German EU Presidency was an opportunity for the United States to work closely with Chancellor Merkel on Kosovo. The relative weakness or lame duck status of other European leaders gave Merkel the opportunity to demonstrate that she could be a "global leader" on this and other issues. Geoana suggested that with the right preparation, Merkel would be receptive to working in tandem with President Bush on a renewed Kosovo strategy as part of Germany's bid for a successful EU presidency. ¶7. (C) Comparing Russia to "an athlete on steroids" Geoana said that he saw both Ukraine and Moldova slowly bending to growing Russian pressure, with Georgia increasingly isolated through Russian energy politics and other "booby traps" from Moscow. Geoana also accused President Basescu of harboring plans to trade Moldovan unification with Romania for tacit acquiescence to allowing Transnistria to become a Russian-run "Kaliningrad" to the east. Geoana said Romania was wasting an opportunity to work with new Eastern European members of the EU in creating a "new European neighborhood policy" from the Baltics to the Black Sea, acting as a Vilnius Group writ large that could influence EU policy towards the East. ¶8. (C) On intelligence matters, Geoana said that the PSD had agreed to Senator Maior becoming the head of Romania's internal service. He said that it was "refreshing" to see a new generation take over the intelligence services given the need to remove the taint of the Ceaucescu-era Securitate, but both Maior and SRI Director Saftoiu were inexperienced and "needed help." He said that he was trying to institute a "new rule" in Romanian politics that the domestic intelligence directorship always go to an opposition politician, adding that this was a "precondition" for sending "one of our best young guys" for the post. Geoana also encouraged the DNI to promote contacts between Romanian parliamentary committees overseeing intelligence matters with their counterparts in the United States, as this would be an investment in a more democratic Romania and a better respected intelligence service. ¶9. (C) Comment: Mircea Geoana's views carrry some weight as he is the heir presumptive in any future coalition government involving the PSD. His views on many issues--including his fundamentally transatlanticist orientation, his comments on Kosovo, and remarks on the desirability of creating an Eastern European bloc within the EU--track closely with those shared by many of his ruling coalition counterparts, underscoring that what separates the PSD from the ruling PD and PNL are frequently matters involving personalities, parties, and political nuance, not ideology or policy. Geoana's skepticism regarding the likelihood of early elections, on the other hand, reflects the fact that the PSD's prospects are not encouraging if President Basescu succeeds in getting an early election contest. End Comment. Taubman
01 August 2011
Are al-Shabaab & Al Qaeda linked?
Reading the press or listening to the TV news you could be forgiven for thinking that these organisations are tied a the hip.
What are the facts?
According to Karen Greenberg in Guardian America CiF:
"According to the National Counterterrorism Centre, al-Shabaab's links to al-Qaida have not reached the organisational level; it can therefore in no way be classified as a strong partner in the al-Qaida network. To quote from the NCC's website:
"While most of [Shabaab's] fighters are predominantly interested in the nationalistic battle against the TFG and not supportive of global jihad, al-Shabaab's senior leadership is affiliated with al-Qaida, and certain extremists aligned with al-Shabaab are believed to have trained and fought in Afghanistan."
A summary report by the Council on Foreign Relations concurs:
"Experts say there are links between individual al-Shabaab leaders and individual members of al-Qaida, but any organizational linkage between the two groups is weak, if it exists at all."
What are the facts?
According to Karen Greenberg in Guardian America CiF:
"According to the National Counterterrorism Centre, al-Shabaab's links to al-Qaida have not reached the organisational level; it can therefore in no way be classified as a strong partner in the al-Qaida network. To quote from the NCC's website:
"While most of [Shabaab's] fighters are predominantly interested in the nationalistic battle against the TFG and not supportive of global jihad, al-Shabaab's senior leadership is affiliated with al-Qaida, and certain extremists aligned with al-Shabaab are believed to have trained and fought in Afghanistan."
A summary report by the Council on Foreign Relations concurs:
"Experts say there are links between individual al-Shabaab leaders and individual members of al-Qaida, but any organizational linkage between the two groups is weak, if it exists at all."
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